What was perhaps the F.L.N.’s most serious leadership crisis of the war now boiled down to a straightforward challenge by the army hard-liners—headed by Boumedienne and backed by the absentee Ben Bella — to the political leadership of the F.L.N. Boumedienne had achieved in very few months a remarkable restructuring of the army (now 35,000 strong), which accorded him its unconditional loyalty, and, further reinforced by the flow of heavy weapons from the Communist bloc, his power and authority had reached imposing heights and continued to rise. Throughout Evian and Lugrin he had kept up a harassing fire on Krim for being “soft” on the French; which, indeed, went far to account for Krim’s bouts of unanticipated intransigence. In addition, Boumedienne and the new young chiefs he had appointed under him were showing thoughts that extended beyond the métier, about the political future of independent Algeria. They considered that it should be markedly more Socialist-orientated and authoritarian than intended by Krim and the “old-guard” F.L.N. politicians.

XREF: Connects to the broader pattern of post-independence military takeovers across decolonized states, where army factions with external weapon support overshadowed civilian political leadership.

Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Alge…, loc. 1445