Neither de Gaulle’s clemency measures nor his other olive sprigs of 1959 produced any more flicker of a quid pro quo from the hard core of the F.L.N. than British governments were to obtain from the I.R.A. The principal effect they had was to anger the army and arouse mistrust among the pieds noirs. … In France, Mollet continued to support de Gaulle on Algeria, while Soustelle was becoming increasingly alienated. There also seemed to be a divergence between de Gaulle and his Prime Minister, Debré; in August when the latter declared that “France would do anything—anything at all—to keep Algeria French,” de Gaulle was saying: “Peace is a necessity. This absurd war….”

XREF: Parallels with British experience negotiating with the I.R.A. suggest a general pattern where hard-line insurgencies resist conciliatory overtures, potentially relevant to other colonial or counterinsurgency conflicts.

Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Alge…, loc. 1030