It was a profound and far-sighted analysis. When France, in extremis between 1954 and 1962, was to cast around for interlocuteurs valables, moderate nationalist representatives with whom compromise solutions might be negotiated, among this “human dust” she was to find virtually none. On the other hand, from earliest days the colonial structure had so functioned as to impede and obviate the emergence of any concerted Muslim opposition body, and for long years it succeeded marvellously; yet again, when the ultimate disaster did occur, France would be taken by surprise, because — for the reasons suggested by Cambon — the resistance movements would be “unknown”.

QUESTION: What specific mechanisms did the colonial structure use to impede a concerted Muslim opposition — and how did these same mechanisms make resistance 'unknown' when it finally did erupt? XREF: Connects to the broader colonialist paradox where systems that prevent moderate opposition end up making eventual revolt more violent and surprising — a pattern seen across decolonization histories.

Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Alge…, loc. 107