Immediately, Lacoste was shackled by the top priority that Mollet had prescribed and that he had himself endorsed — "First win the war". There was an unmistakable element of contradiction apparent in Mollet's policy; for, although his Socialist government was prepared to go further than any other, and at the risk of international complications, to win the war, he was at the same time dropping hints — very secretly — to the F.L.N. that a compromise might be possible. Thus on the one hand he seemed to be demanding "unconditional surrender" and on the other offering conditions; a contradiction that could only confuse, and thereby offer the F.L.N. additional excuse for intransigence.

QUESTION: Does this dual-track approach in Algeria parallel similar contradictions in later counterinsurgency conflicts, and did it ultimately backfire as predicted?

Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Alge…, loc. 475