The first was that his great personal prestige would persuade the Muslim majority to accept his terms. (Whether the pieds noirs would was always of secondary importance to de Gaulle.) But, as he received one snub after another from the F.L.N., his prestige waned until by the end of 1960 it was doubtful whether it could have carried an effective majority. Secondly, he fundamentally misunderstood the nature of the F.L.N., thinking, as a military man himself, that he was dealing with a conventional armed insurrection led by modern Abd-el-Kaders who would sooner or later recognise military defeat and the advantages of sensible compromise. But he could not seem to grasp that his adversaries were ruthless and adroit political revolutionaries, deeply committed to totalitarian principles of "no compromise". Finally, he somehow persuaded himself that time would wait upon him while he found the correct formula and then imposed peace with it. But time would be wrenched from him.

Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Alge…, loc. 1158