It is just conceivable that, if faced by one of the weak governments of the Fourth Republic, the rebels might have succeeded. But there were a number of good reasons why the generals' putsch had collapsed as swiftly as it did: it was planned with undue haste; its leaders gravely overestimated the appeal and influence that retired officers (even those as popular as Challe) can wield over ambitious serving officers; they refused to co-ordinate their plans with the pieds noirs "ultras"; they had no coherent long-range strategy; they miscalculated the encouragement they might expect abroad, and the mood of French civilians at home; and — above all — they failed to consider what might be the reactions of the rank-and-file of the army in Algeria. All these were contributory factors, yet undoubtedly none carried so powerful an impact as de Gaulle's stern commands for obedience to the rank-and-file over the heads of their leaders — the "Victory of the Transistors".

XREF: Connects to French Fourth Republic history and the 1961 Algiers putsch; the 'Victory of the Transistors' neatly parallels modern narratives about media and mass communication trumping elite command.

Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Alge…, loc. 1404