In a world of such rapid change it was also unreal to suggest that four whole years would have to elapse between any cease-fire and the referendum deciding, on de Gaulle's three options. Given the precedent of past bad experiences with French government promises for the future, from Blum—Viollette onwards, it was asking a lot of trust and confidence from the Algerian Muslims of all political hues. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to believe (as does Edward Behr) that "Had such an offer been made in the first three years of the rebellion, it is virtually certain that it would have been immediately accepted by the rebel leaders." It is also no exaggeration to regard de Gaulle's "self-determination" speech of 16 September 1959 as one of the most decisive events of the whole war. Here was a true watershed; nothing that went before was any longer relevant, and nothing could be the same again. There could no longer be any convincing prospect of Algérie française. The genie was out of the bottle; once the fateful word "self-determination" was spoken, it could never be corked up again. In retrospect this was also, perhaps, the last moment in the war when there was a possibility of a compromise peace by which the pieds noirs could have remained in their beloved homeland, one way or another.

XREF: Connects to broader decolonization history and the failure of late reforms to avert revolutionary violence, echoing patterns in other colonial wars.

Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Alge…, loc. 1056