What, then, was the overall aim of the O.A.S., in embarking upon what, by the summer of 1961, already looked like a lost cause? In simplest terms, it was to make it impossible for de Gaulle's representatives to govern in Algeria; beyond that, there was little coherent, or unified, thought. Though studiously vague at the time, Salan told the author in 1973: "I thought that we could somehow orient opinion in France towards some kind of solution like South Africa — a kind of Apartheid for Algeria." … But the O.A.S. was, as one of its chroniclers, Paul Henissart, remarks: "a very odd organisation, an uncooked pudding of conflicting freakish ideas and aspirations and principles". … If a common denominator in O.A.S. policy could be arrived at, it was to render peace talks impossible by killing off the remaining "men of good will", the moderates of both sides, and by random outrages against the Muslim population which would create an atmosphere in which neither negotiation nor compromise could exist. In this they would be eminently successful — but it would produce quite the opposite results from those desired.

XREF: Parallels other cases where terror and provocation strategies backfired, such as the IRA's sectarian violence hardening the Troubles. QUESTION: What specific opposite results did the OAS's random outrages produce in Algeria and in French opinion?

Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Alge…, loc. 1481