Not merely one but several "revolutions" were taking place on a variety of distinct levels; there was, inter alia, a profound social revolution going on within the framework of Algerian Muslim society; and, on the French side, "revolutions" first by the army and later by the OAS against the political authority of France. Finally, there was the tug-of-war for the soul of Algeria as fought externally on the rostrum of the United Nations and the platforms of the Third World, and in the councils of both Western and Eastern blocs. For the West as a whole the Algerian War contained the lessons of two classic failures. First, the failure either to meet, or even comprehend, the aspirations of the Third World. This is with us today not least—or so it seems to me —because Boumedienne's Algeria is very much a creature of its revolutionary experiences and, if the consequences of its powerful influence over the Third World are not always agreeable for the West, the reasons might well be sought in the years 1954–62. Secondly, the lesson of the sad, repeated failure of the moderates, or a "third force," to compete against opposing extremes is one of constant relevance to the contemporary scene; whether it be in Northern Ireland, Southern Africa or Latin America. As in 1793 or 1917, in modern revolutions it is the Montagne that triumphs over the Gironde.

XREF: The Montagne-versus-Gironde framing echoes the classical pattern of revolutionary extremism outcompeting moderation noted in the French and Russian revolutions.

Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Alge…, loc. 10