Algeria was divided into no less than seventy-five separate sectors—which meant there were "seventy-five ways of making war"—and offensive operations tended to be carried out haphazardly, without any co-ordinated plan. "Mounted several days in advance," noted Challe, "they often struck nothing but emptiness." The blows were too ponderous: … They achieved success when they cornered one or two katibas, but this was a rare act…. The populace was warned not to remain in the area and would be regrouped in the plains or the plateau, then, by plane or artillery, the area would be bombarded or fired at on sight. The results, as one could verify, were nil for a veritable orgy of ammunition. … The "stirred-up" rebels would simply slip over into the neighbouring sector, which had rarely been synchronised with the operations; then, as soon as the attacking troops withdrew, the A.L.N. would return to become "master of the mountain" once more.

Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Alge…, loc. 1003