In purely military terms at any rate, the French army had come a long way since its first fumbling operations in 1954. At that time it had begun by repeating the early errors of the Indo-China war, of hitting back with tanks and heavy equipment, 1945-style, against will-o'-the-wisp guerrillas. Now the increase in manpower ordained by Mollet, a steady flow of American helicopters to land them swiftly where they could hurt the rebels most, new units, new leaders, new tactics, and a whole new structure and morale within the army itself, had radically improved its striking power. The new commanders studied local circumstances more closely and tailored their security actions to suit.

XREF: Connects to the broader Algeria war history and the French army's earlier Indo-China failures, showing a military learning curve across colonial conflicts.

Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Alge…, loc. 502