Moving into the vacuum left at all levels by the departing pieds noirs, the infant nation at once found itself enmeshed in the most acute administrative problems. Through their objective of wiping out the rebel Organisation Politico-Administrative, General Challe and his predecessors had also effectively killed off many of the best-educated and politically most sophisticated Algerians: the country's potential leaders. At the same time the corps of native administrators which France — laboriously and always too slowly — had been expanding since 1954 was still far from numerous enough to fulfil the roles so suddenly imposed upon it; added to which, in the first passions of independence many were regarded by the victorious F.L.N. as "quislings" and were promptly sacked — or worse. Whereas, in the 1950s, Tunisia and Morocco were endowed with established systems of government and administration, when Algerian independence came her government had existed only in exile. Thus she was afflicted by a lack of cadres and a lack of experience; but, worst of all, the many latent rifts within the leadership now burst through the thin papering with which the exigencies of war had covered them heretofore. Frantz Fanon had predicted that war would achieve unity among the Algerian élite; peace produced quite the opposite.

XREF: Connects to Fanon's prediction that war would unify the Algerian elite — peace instead exposed rifts; a useful counterpoint to anti-colonial narratives of victory.

Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Alge…, loc. 1628