In the short term the D.P.U.—which Trinquier describes as forming “a flexible bond bond between the authorities and the populace”—undeniably produced results. It was through its information that Ben M’hidi had been caught, and, according to Trinquier, it meant that “no Muslim was able to enter the European quarters without being reported”. But in the long run it was to place the “loyal” Muslim block-wardens in a thoroughly invidious position, often resulting either in their assassination or in the end of their loyalty to France.

XREF: Connects to the broader ethical/theoretical debate on counterinsurgency informant networks and their long-term costs, echoing similar dynamics in Vietnam's Phoenix Program and Iraq's Sons of Iraq. QUESTION: What specific conditions determine whether informant networks survive or collapse into assassination cycles? Worth exploring the long-term systemic consequences.

Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Alge…, loc. 588