In summing up on the Challe Plan, though one may respect Challe’s sincerity in claiming that “the military phase of the rebellion is terminated”, one may well question just how fundamental and lasting were the consequences of this military victory; would they be decisive on the political conduct of the war; was it, on the other hand, going to prove a case of the operation succeeding and the patient succumbing nevertheless? As so often happens with the soldiers on the spot, there was a certain amount of self-deception by the “centurions” of Algeria, a self-deception that would shortly lead to the gravest of misjudgements. Even if Challe had effectively broken up the katibas into penny-packets of shaken guerrillas, so long as they were not all annihilated or won over there always existed the danger that at some future date they might reform themselves and recruit new replacements to fill the gaps. … What was not visible to the French military at the time should also be recalled; namely, that it was already the deliberate strategy of the new A.L.N. chief-of-staff, Boumedienne, to build up a powerful new force outside under the safe umbrella of Tunisian neutrality, at the expense of those hard-pressed katibas of the interior, but waiting for the right opportunity that would present itself one day.

Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Alge…, loc. 1024