Jamal Awil

← A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962

Negotiating with the F.L.N. eliminated Algeria's viable third-force alternative. [causal]

There was one final point: whatever the potential of Si Salah, by renouncing him in favour of talks with the G.P.R.A. emissaries, de Gaulle was in effect dealing, on behalf of the G.P.R.A., yet another blow at the evanescent "third force" in Algeria. Even if he had just intended to use Si Salah as the lever to make the G.P.R.A. negotiate, the fact of their accepting it meant that de Gaulle — regardless of his protests to the contrary — would eventually be forced to negotiate solely with the F.L.N., because there would be no one else, no other interlocuteur valable. Thus, from "Tilsit" and Melun onwards the battle between France and the F.L.N. now began to depart from the blood-stained bled of Algeria for higher realms of politics and diplomacy.

XREF: This connects to broader decolonization dynamics where colonial powers often seek 'moderate' interlocuteurs only to find them non-viable.

Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Alge…, loc. 1202