In practicable terms, the failed putsch meant that de Gaulle now had to abandon all hope of imposing on Algeria the kind of peace "by association with France" for which he had been hoping over the past months. The breaking of the army in Algeria and its ensuing demoralisation deprived de Gaulle of any tool for "enforcement". The April 1961 putsch, says Bernard Tricot, "made even more inevitable the result which it had wanted to prevent, at the same time reducing the chances of attaining it under acceptable conditions". It was abundantly clear that de Gaulle had now no option but to negotiate purposefully to end the war, but as the next round of negotiations approached it was equally clear just how weak his own bargaining hand had become — how strong that of the F.L.N.

XREF: Connects to the general pattern where a military coup attempt paradoxically strengthens the side it opposes and radicalizes the political outcome.

Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Alge…, loc. 1408