Jamal Awil

← A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962

The French army, not settlers, would drive the next six months. [fact]

At the other end of the spectrum, the reception planned for de Gaulle had a far more dangerous — and desperate — look about it. Not for nothing had Delouvrier tried to head de Gaulle off. Nearer the time he had also been warned that an assassination attempt was probable; in fact, no less than four separate plots were in the offing — though each one was more inept than the last. Delouvrier's newly-arrived successor, Morin, was aware that the F.A.F. were mobilising to the limit for the visit. But they were still, in essence, leaderless. What was far more disquieting were fresh rumbles of disaffection from the army. From now on and for the next six months, it was the army — not the pieds noirs — which was to call the tune.

XREF: Connects to the broader narrative of de Gaulle's Algerian crisis and army opposition, foreshadowing the generals' putsch.

Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Alge…, loc. 1293