The more one studies the Algerian revolution, the more one comes to realise how well the F.L.N. leadership succeeded in spinning an impenetrable cocoon of secrecy around the incessant rifts and dissents at the top (and it may well contain a lesson for the West in its present-day fits of political self-destruction). Much as the maquisards of the "interior" may have railed and raged at the "exterior" in its failure to furnish military replenishment, to the Muslim masses of Algeria the mere appearance of this seemingly unruffled, undivided and unrelenting façade was immeasurably heartening and encouraging, and probably did more to keep the flame of the revolution alight than a steady flow of dozens of fresh katibas across the Morice Line would have done. The moral effect of the Melun talks and their skilful exploitation by the G.P.R.A. has already been indicated, and this in turn was more grist to the mill of the hard-liners. Their line of argument was that "self-determination" had been wrested from de Gaulle simply by five years of remorseless violence initiated by the F.L.N. — not by the softer methods of Abbas or Messali. The direct consequence of "self-determination" had been the negotiating table at Melun.

QUESTION: Interesting question about whether negotiation really only became possible through violence, or whether other factors paved the way.

Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Alge…, loc. 1251