Yet is it plausible to argue that the spectacular victories which that army secured were accomplished by peasants who were dragged in it completely against their wishes? Lacking the positive incentive of fighting in defense of the fatherland, and at the same time being prevented from looting and pillaging the lands they conquered, how then can one account for the successive victories that these soldiers were able to secure? In an attempt to answer this important question the following section compares the Pasha’s army with that of Napoelon, an army on whose example it was partly modeled and one which shows that it is possible for a disgruntled peasantry which had been pressed into military service to produce successive victories for its commanders. This is followed by a comparison with the Sultan’s own army – which was Mehmed Ali’s most formidable adversary – a comparison that is intended to show how Ibrahim’s victories were not that hard to come by in the first place.

QUESTION: The puzzle of how unwilling conscripts win wars is posed here; the following comparisons with Napoleon's army and the Sultan's army promise an answer worth tracking. Builds on: "No Egyptian peasant voluntarily joined Mehmed Ali's army."

Khaled Fahmy, All the Pasha_s Men_ Mehmed…, loc. 1360