Ibrahim had to boost the morale of his men to prepare them for the coming battle. For this purpose he wrote a lengthy letter to the soldiers which was printed in the camp press and circulated among senior officers to read aloud in front of the soldiers. … Because of what we know of your courage and valor in the previous wars that you have witnessed in the Hijaz [he told them,] we have selected you from among other soldiers for the duty [of attacking the fortress] of Acre, which is now ready and exhausted. We remind and alert you that once you receive orders of attack hold your rifles tight in your hands and storm your targets like fire . . . Do not fear the enemy, because if they come with swords, then your bayonets will be longer; and if they come with muskets, then the continuous volleys that you have been trained to perform over the past eleven years will make every one of you count as ten of the enemy soldiers. You have to remember our order: first, storm quickly and forcibly and then strengthen your footholds; and, second, listen very carefully to the orders of your commanders and execute them without using your minds in understanding what they mean [wa lā ta'malū shai'an min 'aqlikum]. … The performance of the Mamluks at the battle of Imbāba and that of the Egyptian army at the battle of Acre more than thirty years later could hardly be more sharply contrasted. The Mamluk attitude to war and fighting shown in the 1798 battle against the French was an example of a method of warfare made obsolete by the new evolving drills and technology. al-Jabartī's and Boyer's accounts of the battle show clearly how they relied on their personal bodily strength; how important cavalry was for their army so that nearly no infantry is mentioned in the accounts of the battle; how decisions to charge or retreat were left to the personal initiative of the warriors; how their dress in its embroidered caftans and colorful turbans was an expression of their social status not of their military ranks; and finally how out-of-date their weapons were, comprising as they did swords, pikes, maces and muskets. … Ibrahim's army was a complete contrast to all of this. Instead of relying on cavalry, there was a nearly total reliance on infantry. The successful execution of the battle drew mainly on training drills that the soldiers had been exercising literally for years prior to the battle. Personal strength, courage and valor, were supplanted by strict discipline, blind obedience to superiors and literal implementation of orders. Instead of individual initiative, hierarchical subordination became the norm. Instinctive reactions had been replaced by strict implementation of a plan that had been previously laid down and meticulously rehearsed. In short, the army started to fight as a unit with the soldiers all acting in unison, following commands, orders and signals.

Khaled Fahmy, All the Pasha_s Men_ Mehmed…, loc. 647