While it might be true to argue that the inconclusive and ambivalent nature of the "peace of Kütahia" had its reasons not in any European conspiracy designed to deny Mehmed Ali the fruits of his military conquests, or in British attempts to thwart his efforts at gaining independence, it was also the result of Mehmed Ali’s own cautious and often shifting stand during the difficult negotiations that led to that agreement. There can be various reasons for Mehmed Ali’s caution. One main reason was his receiving conflicting messages from the different European powers regarding their respective possible reactions to his moves against the Sultan. During the Morean war he once wrote to Nagib Efendi in Istanbul telling him "although I may be well versed in European mercantile affairs, I am ignorant when it comes to its political situation." Four years later his position was not much better and that remark was equally applicable to the new situation. In 1832 the French were passing on messages that they would stand by him in his struggle with the Sultan; the Russians, for their part, sent him an envoy, General Mouraviev, only one week before Halil’s arrival in Alexandria with a verbal threat that they would oppose him "with their forces by sea and by land if he persisted in advancing on Constantinople." And the stand of the one European power that mattered most, Great Britain, Mehmed Ali could not figure out, partly because of his own ambivalent position towards the British (a point that will be dealt with later) and partly because of British indecision and wavering attitude regarding the Pasha’s war with the Sultan.

XREF: Builds on the theme of Mehmed Ali's strategic ambivalence toward both the sultan and Europe; connects to earlier claims about his cautious and shifting stand, especially loc 104 and loc 182 about his ambivalence and contradictory goals. Builds on: "Ambivalence toward sultan reflected strategic rebellion, not identity crisis."

Khaled Fahmy, All the Pasha_s Men_ Mehmed…, loc. 253