On more than one occasion Hafiz had a chance to disrupt Ibrahim Pasha's movements in preparation for the battle. Instead, his troops "took up battle positions in such a slow and disorganized manner [and] had to be maintained in combat positions for three days and nights while Ibrahim maneuvered in the area." Furthermore, and against the advice of von Moltke who was sent by the Sultan to assist him, Hafiz Pasha ordered his troops to leave their fortified positions and to venture out in open country, which is precisely what Ibrahim wanted them to do. This he did in compliance with the suggestion of his 'ulamā' who first advised him against fighting on a Friday and then deemed it shameful to sit behind the entrenchment and instead urged him to advance against the adversary in the open. Even after committing these grave mistakes, Hafiz could have still salvaged the situation, especially since at one crucial moment Ibrahim's army was lacking in ammunition. However, he missed that opportunity and, again disregarding von Moltke's advice, refused to order the advance of an unbroken column and kept himself busy with stopping the chaotic retreat of his own troops. The result of this extremely incompetent leadership was disastrous for, in von Moltke's description of the battle, "the army of Hafiz Pasha has ceased to exist . . . The Turks threw down their arms and abandoned their artillery and ammunition, flying in every direction." In the event the Ottomans lost all their guns and up to 10,000 prisoners were captured by Ibrahim Pasha.

XREF: Connects to earlier claims about Egyptian and Ottoman armies' internal weaknesses (loc 1384: Ottoman army internal rivalries crippled effectiveness) and to the theme of professional vs. improvised military practice throughout the book. Builds on: "The Ottoman army's internal rivalries crippled its battlefield effectiveness."

Khaled Fahmy, All the Pasha_s Men_ Mehmed…, loc. 1389