There are, however, much more important reasons for the contrasting performances of the two armies. First, there was the important factor that the Mansure army of the Sultan lacked a commander of the caliber of Ibrahim Pasha. Second, although the army of the Sultan had been able to secure the services of some European advisors, these were neither authorized nor trusted enough to be given high positions in the army; this at a time when Süleyman Pasha had been able to rise up in the military hierarchy until he became second-in-command after Ibrahim Pasha. Third, the Ottoman army never witnessed anything like the superb working relationship between Mehmed Ali, Ibrahim Pasha and Süleyman Pasha; instead, it was a battle-ground for intrigues and internal fights among various officials. A significant factor in the defeat of the Ottoman army in the battle of Horns, for example, was the fact that the Serasker, Husrev Pasha, was jealous of the authority of Hüseyin Pasha, who was appointed as Commander-in-Chief of the army that was to fight Ibrahim Pasha. To curb his influence, Husrev had Mehmed Pasha, one of his protégés, appointed to Hüseyin's staff as second-in-command although the two men could neither work together nor agree on common tactics.

XREF: Extends earlier claims about nepotism and patronage shaping the Egyptian army (loc 922, 925, 930) — here the contrast is inverted to show the Ottoman side suffered comparable dysfunction from intrigue. Builds on: "Nepotism was integral to this army's functioning, not an aberration."

Khaled Fahmy, All the Pasha_s Men_ Mehmed…, loc. 1384