It was realized as early as 1822 that it was the shaykhs who exclusively had the detailed information needed to implement the conscription policy at the village level. Initially, as was described above, the conscription gang would arrive in the village and would round up as many men as could be found. However, given the speed by which news of its imminent arrival would spread to the villages, a wave of desertion ensued making it impossible for the Turkish-speaking officers to ascertain if the men currently present in the village were the only men available or if others had already fled the village. It soon became evident that without the collaboration of the shaykhs the authorities could not be sure that the men actually present were all the men that could potentially be gathered from any given village. Village shaykhs were therefore asked to assist the conscription officers in their task. However, many shaykhs refused to collaborate with the authorities against their fellow villagers and often resisted the pressure from above to comply with the system by employing various ways that ranged from a calculated lack of interest in government policies to deliberate attempts to frustrate such policies.

XREF: Builds on loc 410's claim that failed shaykhs were whipped and hanged, showing the coercive relationship between state and intermediaries from the other side. Builds on: "Egyptian governors' propaganda tours augmented the army's deterrence value."

Khaled Fahmy, All the Pasha_s Men_ Mehmed…, loc. 479