Formalism may be more broadly viewed as extending to any justification that treats as inexorable a choice that is not. In this broader sense, the claimed inexorability might come from something other than rule formulations. To mask, for example, a political, moral, or social choice in the language of "original intent" when original intent in fact does not provide a uniquely correct answer to the issue might be considered formalistic in the same way that masking a political, moral, or social choice in the language of the meaning of a rule is considered formalistic when that language does not provide a uniquely correct answer. Similarly, masking choice in the language of mathematical economic derivation or in the language of a unique solution to some "balance" might be considered formalistic if these methods are in fact comparatively indeterminate.

DEFINE: Broadens formalism from narrow rule-following to any justification that treats non-inexorable choices as inexorable, including original intent, economics, and balance rhetoric. Builds on: "Believing legal categories are natural kinds obscures their contingent choices."

Frederick Schauer, Frederick Schauer - Formali…, loc. 34