The case just mentioned is much more complicated than the related principle, homologous to odisse quem laeseris, which says that one loves the one to whom he has done good. It is understandable that one projects the satisfaction of his own good action on the one who has given him the opportunity for it: in the love for the one for whom he has made sacrifices he loves in essence himself, just as in the hate against the one to whom he has done an injustice he hates himself. The sense of obligation that the good action leaves in the doer of good, that particular form of noblesse oblige, cannot be explained with so simple a psychology. I believe that, in effect, an a priori condition is involved here: that each action of this type—despite its apparent free will, despite its apparent character of opus supererogationis—derives from an obligation; that in such behavior a profound obligation is implicit which, in a certain way, is manifested and made visible through action.

QUESTION: The a priori obligation behind noble actions is intriguing — is this a genuine psychological principle or a rationalization after the fact?

DEFINE: Introduces the concept that apparently free-will good actions derive from an implicit a priori obligation.

Georg Simmel, on individuality and social…, loc. 427