Truth is determined by life-support, not independent reality. [definitional]
It is this independence of truth, which has been presupposed throughout history, that Pragmatism most avidly denies. Our external life no less than our internal life, the pragmatist claims, is based on some imagination of knowledge. If it is true it will preserve and support our life; if it is an error, it will lead us into ruin. Our imaginations are formed by purely psychic influences. In no way are they mechanical reflections of the reality in which our real lives are intertwined. Hence it would be a most remarkable coincidence if they were to lead to desirable and predictable consequences within the realm of the real. It is probable, however, that among the numerous impressions and ideas which determine our active life, there are those which obtain the title of truth because they support and sustain life, while others with opposing consequences are called erroneous. Hence there is no originally independent truth which is subsequently drawn into the stream of life in order to guide it appropriately. On the contrary, among the infinite number of images and ideas which are borne along on the stream of our consciousness, there are some which correspond with our will to live. One might say that this is an accident; without this accident, however, we could not exist. It is precisely these supportive ideas which we recognize as right and true. Thus it is neither the objects by themselves, nor sovereign reason, which determine the truth-value of our thoughts. Rather, it is life—which expresses itself sometimes through the stark necessities of survival, sometimes through the deepest spiritual needs—that forces us to classify our ideas, one pole of which we designate as the full truth and the other as full error.
XREF: This restates the core Pragmatist position (James/Dewey) where truth is what works; connects to the ongoing debate with correspondence theories of truth.
XREF: Resonates with William James's classic pragmatist formulation — this appears to be a Continental European pragmatist (possibly Hans Vaihinger or Friedrich Nietzsche's influence) restating James's 'what works is true' doctrine.
Georg Simmel, on individuality and social…, loc. 857