Thus, when Winter discloses that "[i]n effect, then, Bobbitt concedes that law faces the very predicament that Unger identifies""-that legal decisions are sometimes indeterminate-he discloses nothing because I "concede" nothing. Rather, it is a fundamental part of my views that the modalities may conflict, that they are incommensurable, and thus that no decision-procedure can determine the outcome in advance without sacrificing legitimacy. … It is justified to the extent that it produces results that can be justified-can be judged according to the prevailing moral sense of the day. The system as a whole, however, is justified because it has a role for the conscience within a legitimate system, though it is not the only conceivable system that can be justified on these grounds.

DEFINE: Explains what 'modalities of law' mean: distinct modes of legal argument that can conflict and are incommensurable, so no decision-procedure can pre-determine outcomes. Builds on: "Modal conflicts decide among incommensurables without requiring derived parameters"

Philip Chase Bobbitt, Philip Chase Bobbitt - Refl…, loc. 786