I think, ironically, that it has been a concentration on what renders a legal statement true that has misled us. We think that an understanding of a legal statement must consist in a grasp of what would make it true and that such a grasp must consist in a knowledge of how we could recognize that condition as obtaining. And therefore it is also widely held that only by having a conclusive recognition that the condition obtained could we give meaning to the statement itself, but this I deny. My account of how a proposition acquires meaning differs from the standard account, which is shared by all these schools, so that problems of indeterminacy, authoritativeness, et cetera, do not have the same significance for me that they do for the schools of thought mentioned above.

DEFINE: Distinguishes a truth-conditional account of meaning from an alternative account where meaning does not depend on recognizing the conditions that would make a statement true.

Philip Chase Bobbitt, Philip Chase Bobbitt - Refl…, loc. 378