We make an important distinction between law and even the general orders of a gangster. We feel that the law's strictures-and its sanctions-are different in that they are obligatory in a way that the outlaw's commands are not. Austin's analysis has no place for any such distinction, because it defines an obligation as subjection to the threat of force, and so founds the authority of law entirely on the sovereign's ability and will to harm those who disobey. Perhaps the distinction we make is illusory-perhaps our feelings of some special authority attaching to the law is based on religious hangover or another sort of mass self-deception. But Austin does not demonstrate this, and we are entitled to insist that an analysis of our concept of law either acknowledge and explain our attitudes, or show why they are mistaken.

XREF: Connects to Hart's critique of Austin's command theory and the internal aspect of rules, a central debate in legal positivism. QUESTION: What explains the felt authority of law if not coercion — shared norms, conventions, or something deeper? Builds on: "The coercion powering law lacks a satisfactory justificatory account"

Ronald Dworkin, Ronald Dworkin - The Model …, loc. 40