Austin had said that every rule is a general command, and that a person is obligated under a rule if he is liable to be hurt should he disobey it. Hart points out that this obliterates the distinction between being obliged to do something and being obligated to do it. If one is bound by a rule he is obligated, not merely obliged, to do what it provides, and therefore being bound by a rule must be different from being subject to an injury if one disobeys an order. A rule differs from an order, among other ways, by being normative, by setting a standard of behavior that has a call on its subject beyond the threat that may enforce it.

DEFINE: Clarifies Hart's distinction between being obliged (external threat) and being obligated (normative binding), a key terminological distinction in legal philosophy. XREF: Connects to Austin's command theory of law and Hart's critique in 'The Concept of Law' — distinguishes internal acceptance of rules from external sanctions. Builds on: "Legal obligation involves felt authority beyond mere coercive threat."

Ronald Dworkin, Ronald Dworkin - The Model …, loc. 47