In sum, monetary austerity and fi scal austerity were two sides of the same coin that worked in a reciprocal fashion. British Treasury offi cial Sir Otto Niemeyer summarized this clearly when he advised the Brazilian government, in his capacity as executive director of the Bank of England: “Th e two factors, budget equilibrium and stable money, must march together; and neither one can be maintained without the other” (Niemeyer 1931, 4). Indeed, we have seen how budgetary orthodoxy was a prerequisite for the revaluation of currency. At the same time, defl ationary monetary policy— in the form of rising interest rates and the curtailment of money supply— increased the cost for the government to borrow, thus limiting its expansionary projects. Resolution VII of the Brussels Commission on Currency and Exchange was explicit: “If the wise control of credit brings dear money, this result will in itself help to promote economy” (Resolution VII, Commission on Currency and Exchange, Brussels 1920, vol. 1, 19).

Clara E. Mattei, The Capital Order, loc. 773