Once Lippmann delivered the Godkin Lectures at Harvard in May 1934, however, it became apparent that his perspective on both the New Deal and economic planning was beginning to change. Like his earlier work, these lectures manifested an unremitting skepticism about the practicability of laissezfaire, which he analogized to “a man condemned who is reprieved repeatedly because he works miracles.” Lippmann argued that capitalism was sustained by the rising standard of living it enabled, but that improvements in living conditions had increased the price of social order from the full dinner pail to the twocar garage in a matter of de cades. Such an order, he concluded, “is inherently unstable.” But his perspective was infl ected by a new goal: he hoped to identify, in light of this instability, a foundation on which to preserve the viability of a capitalist economy. His attention now centered on the task of generating a “defense of liberty” that was grounded, unlike its nineteenthcentury pre de ces sors, in “positive convictions and affi rmative principles.” This would require identifying a “form of control” that was “compatible with the variability, the complexity, and the dynamic character of the capitalist order.” For this vision Lippmann adopted the uneasy label “free collectivism,” which he described as the doctrine of a state that maintained responsibility for “the operation of the economic order as a whole” while preserving “within very wide limits the liberty of private transactions.”

Angus Burgin, The Great Persuasion, loc. 153