Consider the point made in Hume's Treatise on Human Nature (but see also Sugden 1986) that norms of good behavior in business evolve from an economic interest in keeping promises and acquiring a reputation for honest dealing: "Afterwards a sentiment of morals concurs with interest, and becomes a new obligation upon mankind" ( 1969: 574). There being no such interest in Sicily, or only to a limited extent, on account of the protection of the mafia, the likelihood that these norms will become dominant, anticipating experience and giving rise to virtuous circles, is diminished. This may also explain why the opposite norm obtains and the ability to cheat is praised and encouraged.

XREF: Connects to institutional economics and the idea that social norms emerge from repeated economic interactions — fits with game theory and reputation-based cooperation literature. QUESTION: Does mafia protection actively suppress honest-dealing norms, or merely fail to reward them? The causal direction here is worth probing.

Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia The Busi…, loc. 71