An old argument contends that mafia have good reasons not to push their demands too far because, as Franchetti ( 1974) claims, "If the villains made use of their destructive abilities to an extreme degree, they would soon lack the very matter from which to steal" (p. 126). This is less a theoretical than an empirical observation, for it does not hold under all circumstances. The extent to which it does hold depends on the mafioso's time horizon: as it shortens, the temptation to prey grows. As with all dealers, if the future looks uncertain, protectors will maximize present over future income. They will be more likely either to sell bogus protection or to charge extortionate prices for it, or both. Moreover, they will have an incentive to arbitrate between criminals and victims rather than systematically protect the latter or, worse, protect only delinquents. Finally, if customers know that the mafioso's "life expectancy" is short, they will be reluctant to buy protection. Consequently, mafiosi need to employ energetic forms of promotion. In brief, as the time horizon shrinks, protection approaches extortion. Conversely, mafiosi who see a long future in business ahead of them, or ahead of their descendants, are less likely to harass customers for fear of risking future income. They will also be more likely to protect victims rather than robbers or cheaters, and, correspondingly, dealers will also feel more relaxed about purchasing protection.

Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia The Busi…, loc. 86