Our clients, too, need to know that we know something about them; otherwise they would not take us as credible guarantors. Our capacity for gathering information is part of our reputation. They may even have an interest in deliberately disclosing certain details about themselves, for each party understands that the other will be encouraged to enter into the transaction if he knows that we, as guarantor, are in possession of privileged information. They need not necessarily know what we know about the other; indeed, it is better if they do not, for if our position as monopolist over information is weakened, they may learn to exchange without our guarantees or even step in as potential guarantors themselves. but they must at least believe that we know enough to keep the other party in line.

XREF: Relates to intermediary/information-asymmetry economics and the role of trust in transaction security.

Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia The Busi…, loc. 95