This argument, however, is not necessarily pessimistic in its conclusions. It also suggests hypothetical conditions under which a conflict of interest between mafioso and seller might dissolve the demand for mafia services: the larger the group of unprotected potential buyers, the greater the benefits for the seller in selling high-quality goods, irrespective of protection. The seller rather than rely solely on the restricted group of buyers guaranteed by the mafioso. The mafioso's protection would therefore become redundant, as any customer would be well treated. This is a case in which the market, by imposing its own self-enforcing pressure for honesty, might disrupt the equilibrium between seller and mafioso. Something of this kind did in fact happen in the Palermo fruit and vegetable market (see Chapter 8).

XREF: Connects to market self-regulation and reputation mechanisms in economics literature (e.g., game-theoretic models of honesty without enforcement). QUESTION: What threshold of unprotected buyers makes mafia protection redundant, and does this hold beyond perishable-goods markets?

Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia The Busi…, loc. 781