Exactly why "Peppe" resorts so frequently to violence, however, is not easy to establish. Not all punishments are violent, and often force is used as nothing more than an implicit threat in the bargaining process. Nonetheless, conflict escalates into violence in Sicily with notorious frequency, a fact that is remarkable not on empirical grounds, given what we know of mafia practices, but in terms of theoretical expectations. The range of possible sanctions which fall short of violence would seem sufficient to relegate the use of force to the background and still allow the supply of effective protection. If any evolution can be detected in legal economic affairs it is coward subtle contractual forms which exclude the threat of violence to deter defectors. Commercial defeat and physical defeat are increasingly divergent. If the mafia could offer protection without undue recourse to violence, it would seem rational to do so, as the corresponding risks and costs should be fewer. So why is it, then, that violence features so prominently in the career and reputation of a mafioso? Why are mafia groups traditionally so militarized?

QUESTION: The passage poses an unresolved puzzle: why does the mafia resort to violence when non-violent sanctions would suffice and cost less? This invites further investigation into reputation and signaling functions of violence.

Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia The Busi…, loc. 106