Riccardo Misasi, minister for the Mezzogiorno in 1990 and leader of the Christian Democrats in Calabria, volunteered a solution to the problem of widespread bid rigging: I suggested to some regions, and to my [sic] Calabria in particular, an automatic mechanism which eliminates every discretionary element and establishes an automatic rotation among firms and consortiums selected strictly on the basis of the fairness of their behavior. It is a rule which, if generally applied, would violate the Constitution .... But can we not make an exception here in the fight against the mafia and corruption? This rule... would obliterate every chance of corruption, of anomalous relations between entrepreneurship and political power. (Repubblica, May 19, 1990) … In short, if mafia methods are bad, let us institutionalize them!

DEFINE: The passage illustrates the paradox of 'administered' or institutionalized mafia methods masquerading as anti-corruption mechanisms. QUESTION: Worth investigating: how often do well-intentioned 'automatic' allocation schemes actually mirror the cartel/monopoly logic they claim to combat?

Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia The Busi…, loc. 582