The story begins toward the end of the 1950s. Before this time mafia families were not connected by a collective structure. As Judge Cesare Terranova put it, they "were a mosaic of small republics with topographical borders marked by tradition" (CPM: 4-xvii, 656), or, as an economist might say, a territorial oligopoly more akin to a constellation of independent firms than a federation of units bound by explicit rules. The equilibrium held, when it did, because of "natural" mechanisms, dependent on both protection and the dynamics of the protected markets, and also because of casual bargaining between pairs or among clusters of firms. Perhaps this universe was not as lacking in collective consciousness as Hess (1973) maintains, though not by much. Since the end of the 1950s, however, a series of attempts has been made to establish a more systematic organization among firms—not as a single cartel embracing all Sicilian families, as so many observers simplistically believe, but a number of cartels, at least one per province. The first to attempt this coordination was the province of Palermo, which had the highest concentration of families (approximately forty-six; see Table 2).

XREF: Relates to economic concepts of territorial oligopoly and cartels applied to organized crime — connects to industrial organization literature.

Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia The Busi…, loc. 283