If votes are a commodity, elections become a transaction in which voters are sellers and politicians buyers. But this market is a cumbersome one in which the buyer is confronted, first, with a question of scale; that s, in any sizable constituency no candidate can realistically negotiate with each individual voter. Next there is the problem of verification (how can the candidate be sure that voter X voted for him?) and hence of trust (that is, should X be paid for his vote before or after the election?). Finally there is the issue of payment: what is the most efficient way to pay all the people who sell their votes? The sellers, too, have their difficulties, for how can they be sure that a candidate will pay up once they have voted for him? A more ideal setting for the mafia can scarcely be imagined.

XREF: Connects to concepts of vote buying as a principal-agent problem and the trust/verification frictions described in market design literature.

Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia The Busi…, loc. 471