The richest and most intricate agency relationships arise from collectivization. Principals often entrust their property to strangers, having recognized the value of aggregating their assets with those of others to enjoy economies of scale and to spread risk. By joining a money market fund, they command higher rates of interest for their meager savings than are otherwise available. By entrusting funds to an insurance company, they enjoy considerable protection at relatively small cost … These collective forms of agency frequently expand the temporal frame of social exchange, systematically anticipating and exploiting future contingencies. Principals transfer money or property to organizational agents in the expectation of some future payoff in the form of interest, dividends, pensions, inheritance, insurance benefits, or better health. … These "futures transactions" require even more resilient agency relationships than those that delegate property or responsibility to employees, experts, data collectors, or brokers. They demand that commitment be conferred far in advance of payoff without any necessary confirmation during the interim that the return on investment will eventually be honored. Agency arrangements serve as a temporal conduit, connecting relevant past events and future contingencies with present resources.

XREF: Connects to principal-agent theory and economic sociology on organizational trust, deferred compensation, and institutional risk-pooling.

Shapiro, Susan P., The Social Control of Imper…, loc. 29