How socially approved possibilities of sanction are distributed has a bearing also on the side third parties would take if a breach of trust should occur, or whether – and to what extent – they would hold whoever commits a breach of trust responsible, or whether they would charge the truster with naivety or foolishness. If the truster unthinkingly waives his right to apply sanctions, he may lose thereby the possibility of slanting the attribution of guilt in his own favour, and find himself the object of reproach. If I ask a stranger to bring my gold watch to a watchmaker who is to repair it, and he violates my trust, I lose thereby not just my watch, but my social standing. … In general, it is possible to see in operation in the attribution of guilt a morality which goes well beyond official law, has a considerable capacity for fine discriminations, is at the same time predictable, and whose verdict primarily depends on whether control over the situation has been renounced out of necessity or by carelessness. The fact that such attributions of guilt are typified and predictable assists the formation of trust, allowing the truster to foresee whether he is risking damage only or derision as well.

Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power, loc. 182