Recall Buber's (1951, 7) supposition that I trust someone "without being able to offer sufficient reasons for my trust in him." Note how peculiar this would be in a real-world relationship. When I first meet you, perhaps I take risks merely optimistically or out of hope. For Buber this could be genuine trust, because it has no grounds, at least no grounds in you. Ten years later, when I have great experience of your trustworthiness, I genuinely do trust you. This would not be trust for Buber, however, because it is based on sufficient reasons. Buber insists that trust is, in the end, ungrounded.

QUESTION: This inverted definition begs the question: does trust that earns sufficient reasons stop being trust for Buber, and is that tenable?

Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, loc. 362