On this account, in some societies trust must be beneficial. It would be in the interests of one's children to teach them to be optimistic about others. Trust cannot be produced at will, although it can be willfully instilled, as in children. Moreover, acting as if one trusts can be willed repeatedly so that one may slowly develop optimistic expectations of trustworthiness. In many potentially iterated prisoner's dilemma interactions, one should open with a cooperative move in the hope of engaging the other also to be cooperative. This is not merely a moral injunction. It is a rational claim of self-interest (see discussion of the iterated prisoner's dilemma in chapter 1). One should open with cooperation when the expected long-run benefits of iterated cooperation outweigh the short-term risk of loss.

XREF: This builds directly on iterated prisoner's dilemma strategy from chapter 1, likely echoing Axelrod's tit-for-tat findings on cooperation emerging through self-interest. QUESTION: How is 'rational' trust distinguished from moral trust here? Does the author consider the two reconcilable?

Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, loc. 544