Jamal Awil

← Trust and Trustworthiness

Precise positions alienate voters on normally distributed issues. [causal]

For issues that have a more or less normal distribution of preferences, on the other hand, staking oneself to a precise position is tantamount to putting distance between oneself and most voters. The task of gaining the trust of constituents, then, is complicated by the virtual certainty that effectiveness in office will correlate strongly with disappointing or even offending large numbers of constituents on particular issues. Dwight Eisenhower had the nearly unique advantage of being elected by a populace ignorant of any of his views (if he had any), and he did a fairly good job of maintaining such vagueness through eight years in office. Ronald Reagan, the best president the American right has ever had, was reviled by much of that right soon after he entered office. Franklin Roosevelt campaigned as a fiscal conservative and then soon abandoned the policy as president. Thomas Jefferson, among the most committed of democrats, bought Louisiana from the French without constitutional authority or congressional approval.

XREF: Connects to the median voter theorem and spatial models of electoral competition.

Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, loc. 771