That trust is essentially rational is a common view. For example, James Coleman (1990, chapter 5; also see several contributions to Gambetta 1988) bases his account of trust on complex rational expectations. There are two central elements in applying a rational-choice account of trust: incentives of the trusted to fulfill the trust and knowledge to allow the truster to trust. The knowledge at issue, of course, is that of the potential truster, not that of the theorist or social scientist who observes or analyzes trust. Hence we require an account of the epistemology of individual knowledge or belief, of street-level epistemology, to complete the rational theory of trust (see chapter 5).

DEFINE: Distinguishes two central elements of rational-choice trust: incentives of the trusted and knowledge of the truster — framing trust as a rational calculation. XREF: Connects to philosophical debates about trust vs. rational choice and to 'street-level epistemology' as a distinct research program.

Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, loc. 110