Several other visions of trust that are fairly clearly articulated, sometimes only implicitly in part, differ from trust as encapsulated interest. … These assumptions are that trust is not a matter of knowledge (in other words, it is noncognitive), that it is normative in some moral sense, that it is dependent on the characteristics of the trusted other than the trusted's commitments to the truster, and that it is a good in much the way that various consumption goods are goods or that capital of various kinds is a good. … The extant accounts of trust as a good are misleadingly said to be about trust when in fact they are about trustworthiness. When they are cast as being about trust, they are incoherent; when recast as being about trustworthiness, they can be compelling.

DEFINE: Distinguishes trust (encapsulated interest) from trustworthiness, arguing accounts cast as about trust are really about trustworthiness.

Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, loc. 336