Trust typically arises at the level of, and is grounded in, relatively small-scale interactions. It is not restricted to merely dyadic relationships, but it cannot be grounded in interactions involving very large numbers of people. It is generally a cognitive notion, and it faces epistemological and temporal limits on just how many relationships one person can master. Because most of us live in large-scale societies, we need devices other than trusting and trustworthiness to make many of our more or less cooperative activities go well. Typically, we can overcome the scale limits of direct trusting by relying on social constructions such as intermediary guarantors and reputations, although even these devices are commonly limited. To go much further, we must have strong institutional and especially legal backing that displaces the need for trust and reliance on others' doubtful trustworthiness. Unfortunately, such backing cannot be made to work efficiently—or, in some contexts, even at all.

XREF: Connects to Ostrom's work on commons governance and collective action, and to Elinor's scale-of-trust findings.

Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, loc. 883