Consider whether it could be required in common contexts. Is it moral or immoral to know or not to know, say, that Afghanistan is ruled by the Taliban? … Unless you can say, as one might of the State Department official, that I am in the wrong not to know those things about you that attest to your trustworthiness with respect to what is potentially at issue between us, then you cannot say it is morally incumbent on me to trust you. Similarly, to say that it is a virtue to trust is to say that it is a virtue to know that others are trustworthy. This is largely incoherent. It is surely a virtue in many contexts to act as one would if one did trust. It is the behavior or the inclination to such behavior, however, not knowledge, that is a virtue.

DEFINE: Reframes trust as an inclination to behave as if one trusted, separating it from knowledge of another's trustworthiness.

Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, loc. 373